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INTRODUCTION
Traditional approaches to halting tropical deforestation by small-scale farmers have primarily focused on
increasing the private benefits of sustainable alternatives, such as agroforestry (Current, et al., 1985), or
on increasing the costs of deforestation by correcting domestic policy distortions (Vosti, et al., 1997). This
study seeks to enhance the effectiveness of these approaches by investigating whether the global
environmental values of forests can be captured by  farmers in developing countries. Specifically we
investigate the possibility of small-scale farmers in the Peruvian Amazon supplying carbon sequestration
services.
International trade in carbon sequestration services is permitted under the Clean Development Mechanism
of the  Kyoto Protocol to the Climate Change Convention (1997). If gains to trade exist, farmers in
developing countries could be  compensated for increasing forested areas on their farms, by carbon
emitters in developed countries.
We use the Contingent Valuation Method (Freeman, 1994; Mitchell and Carson, 1989) to elicit the
compensation required by farmers to switch to a land use system which would lower carbon emissions.
These values are then compared to the cost of emission reduction by switching to cleaner fuels.
Our estimates of the cost of supplying carbon sequestration services through forestry activities is one of
the rare  estimates  relating to small-scale farmers (Ridley, 1997). Furthermore, while other studies have
based their estimates on  the average costs of projects promoting forestry activities, our study  elicits the
marginal cost of emission reducing land use change, directly from farmers through the use of the
Contingent Valuation Method (CVM). We use  CVM rather than land prices to estimate the compensation
required, primarily because we hypothesize that forested land may provide non-market local benefits to
forest dwellers, in the form of  environmental services (such as soil recuperation, shade or preservation of
habitat for game animals) or  bequest or option  values. A second reason is that land markets in the area
are very thin, which is not surprising, given low population densities and the paucity of formal land titles.
The involvement of farmers in determining required levels of compensation is likely to  facilitate
implementation and should also ensure that the welfare of resource-poor farmers is at least maintained,
while environmental  improvement occurs.
Ours is also one of the very few  CVM studies of the welfare change from forestry activities,  from the
perspective of farmers in developing countries. Shyamsunder and Kramer (1996) used CVM to estimate
the opportunity cost of forest preservation in Madagascar. Our study  extends their work by separating out
economic gains or losses, from any possible environmental benefits farmers may obtain from the change
in land use.
CONTINGENT VALUATION ESTIMATES
Proposed Land Use Change
The study site is the rural area influenced by  the city of Pucallpa in the Ucayali Region of the Peruvian
Amazon and consists of settlements stretching back from the main road connecting Pucallpa to Lima.2
Satellite images from 1993 show that 70% of the area is deforested (Fujisaka, 1996). The population
density is around 5 persons/km
2 (INEI, 1995).  Slash-and burn farmers who migrated to the area during
the last three to four decades, clear a small area of logged-over primary forest or secondary forest on their
farms and plant annual and semi-perennial crops for about two years, after which the land is left fallow
for about three years, while another part of the farm is cleared for agriculture. This land use system is
unsustainable because fallow periods are too short to fully recuperate the soil.
The  land use change for which the compensation is elicited is two-fold:  replacement of slash-and-burn
agriculture by (i) preservation of natural forest on one hectare of the farm, on which extraction of forest
products is totally prohibited and (ii) a  simultaneous shift to  a multi-strata agroforestry system,  which
combines crops with useful tree species which mimic natural succession (Nair, 1993), on another hectare
of the farm.  The proposed  change in land use is conceived as a first step, which if eventually extended to
most of the farm, would result in a land use system in which  most species are conserved and  the impact
on natural biophysical processes is minimized through forest preservation, while simultaneously  farmers’
requirements for agricultural and forest products is satisfied through the adoption of agroforestry. The
substitution of  slash-and-burn  agriculture by  agroforestry  is expected to result in a net increase in
carbon sequestration, because of the higher aboveground biomass of agroforestry systems. In the case of
forest preservation, although the net carbon balance of mature forests is approximately zero, protection of
forests from land conversion prevents carbon emissions, which would occur if forested land were
converted to slash-and-burn agriculture. Thus, compensation for avoiding emissions through forest
preservation is justified if the forest is genuinely under threat and if “leakage” does not occur, i.e. another
area of forest is not cleared as a substitute. Forests in our study area are clearly under threat, as the
deforestation data show. Our proposed land use change also attempts to reduce “leakage”  by
simultaneously providing a viable alternative to deforestation: agroforestry supported by payments for
sequestration services. An alternative would be to tax farmers for deforestation. This is considered
undesirable in the case of small-scale farmers because of equity considerations and enforcement
difficulties (Schneider, 1995).
Welfare Measures
The required compensation for economic losses implied by changes in land use without taking into
account environmental benefits, can be defined as:
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where the RHS is the indirect utility function for a representative farmer. M is income, S a vector of
individual characteristics, L0  the area currently available for agriculture and E0  the current level of
environmental services provided by forests. L1 = land available for agriculture after the proposed land use
change, which is less than before, because land has to be set aside for forest preservation and agroforestry.
The reduction in available land is less for agroforestry than for forest preservation, because agroforestry
includes some agricultural activities. WTA0  is the minimum compensation required to leave the farmer as
well-off as before land use change, without taking environmental benefits into consideration. When the
change in environmental benefits is also taken into consideration, the welfare change is:
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where E1 = the extra environmental benefits available after land use change and WTA1 is the minimum
compensation required to leave the farmer as well-off as before land use change, taking both economic
losses and environmental benefits into account.
The value of environmental services (WTA0  - WTA1  ) can be expressed as an indirect WTP, that is the
maximum amount farmers are willing to pay for the environmental services of forests. This implies that
the payment vehicle for the WTP for environmental services is expressed in terms of a reduced
compensation.3
Methodological framework
A full discussion of the methodological framework is given in Smith, et al. (1997). The main points are
summarized here.
The simulated market in the CVM survey is based on the emerging market in carbon sequestration
services. Farmers are presented with a possible future project in which utility companies in developed
countries, driven by emission reduction targets, are willing to compensate farmers who make the proposed
land use change. Farmers are asked to bid for a fixed annual payment  for each hectare of preserved forest
and separately for each hectare of agroforestry. Payments would cease if these areas are cleared for slash-
and burn. Farmers are reminded that they are competing against alternative suppliers of carbon
sequestration services and that there is no guarantee that their bids will be acceptable.
The compensation each farmer  requires for economic losses resulting from preserving one hectare of
forest and shifting to agroforestry on one hectare  (WTA0 ) is first elicited.  Farmers are then asked by how
much (if anything) they are willing to discount the compensation required because of the environmental
services resulting from the proposed land use change. This discounted value provides an estimate of
WTA1 . The difference between WTA0  and WTA1  provides an implicit WTP for environmental services,
in the form of foregone compensation.
Open ended questions (OEQ), rather than dichotomous choice questions (DCQ) were found to function
adequately, because bargaining, rather than fixed prices, is the norm in local transactions. The use of a
WTA format is justified because farmers are being asked to change land use on their own farms (Mitchell
and Carson, 1989).
Personal interviews were carried out at the homes of 214 respondents, with extensive use of pictorial aids.
Special survey techniques capitalizing on our  knowledge of the local culture were used to elicit values.
The concept of valuing a non-market good in monetary terms was communicated after extensive pre-
testing, by eliciting farmers’ asking wage for a day’s hard labor in the sun and comparing it to their
asking wage for working in the shade.
Results
The average farm size for the sample is 29 ha. Land is mainly acquired through occupation of forested
land. The government eventually legalizes occupied land if farmers begin cultivating the land and obtain
documents from the community certifying their  intention to remain on the land. The majority of farmers
(56%) have these informal certificates from the community. An additional 26% have legal land titles. The
few farmers who have no documents are planting trees on the land to establish recognition of their
intention to remain on the land. Most farmers appear to be well established in the area. Only 35% had
previously occupied another farm.
The survey generated a high degree of interest, with 72% of farmers describing  it in superlative terms.
The response rate was very high: only 15 farmers were unable to answer one or more valuation questions.
Answers to questions on the use of forests reveal that farmers appear to deforest, not because it is their
preferred use of forests, but because of the lack of alternatives. Forests as a source of crop land is never
mentioned in open-ended questions and is selected by only a minority, when this use is presented as an
option. Although consumptive uses of forests dominate, it is notable that 76% of farmers have some
knowledge of non-consumptive environmental services, such as air purification and shade. Environmental
services related to the quality of life are mentioned more frequently than those related to agricultural
productivity. Farmers’ environmental knowledge is obtained both informally and from projects, the media
and schools. After farmers receive further information about environmental services, during the survey,
there are notable increases in the number of farmers mentioning  option values and indirect uses relating
to agricultural productivity (Smith et al., 1997).
The average WTA0  (that is the annual compensation required without taking environmental values into
consideration), is $218 for preserving a hectare of forest and $138 for converting one hectare to
agroforestry. The statistically significant difference between the two values is consistent with the lower4
(short term) economic loss of conversion to agroforestry, compared to forest preservation. Median WTA
values - $195 for forest preservation and $117 for agroforestry - are not very much lower than the means
indicating that outliers are not overly influencing average estimates (Table 1).
The mean indirect WTP values for  local environmental services  (WTA0  - WTA1 ) is $67 for forest
preservation and $41 for agroforestry. The statistically  significant difference of $26 reflects the higher
environmental benefits generated under pure forest preservation. Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom,
resource-poor farmers in the Peruvian Amazon appear to be willing to forgo significant amounts of
potential income in order to obtain the local environmental services of forests.
Valuation functions are estimated to explain the determinants of WTA and WTP estimates and thus test
the validity of the estimates. Included regressors are given in Table 2. For WTA,  these include
sociological variables, such as education; variables reflecting the opportunity cost of setting aside land
(such as variables reflecting the cultivation of cash crops); an income proxy (represented by the quality of
housing); the extent of deforestation and a number of dummy variables.
Ordinary Least Squares estimates (OLS), corrected for heteroskedasticity, are reported in Table 3 for the
WTA valuation function.. All significant variables have the expected effect on WTA. A strong positive
link is revealed between the opportunity costs of setting aside land and the size of the compensation
demanded. Also farmers who have deforested more, require a higher compensation to preserve their
remaining forested areas, while farmers who are better off, require a lower compensation.
Regressors for the WTP valuation function include sociological variables; proxy variables for income
generated from the farm (such as size of farm); variables depicting use of forest products; variables
reflecting stated attitudes to forests and a variable identifying non-transient farmers (number of years in
previous location).
Regression results, given in Table 4, show that WTP for environmental services has a powerful
association with attitudinal variables, even after controlling for education. This confirms that farmers are
generally consistent between attitudes and behavioral intentions. Non-transient farmers are willing to pay
significantly more for environmental services, which is consistent with the fact that they may have more
opportunities to enjoy environmental benefits that may be noticeable in the medium or long run. The
larger the extent of deforestation that has already occurred, the larger the perceived values of forest
environmental services. These  results indicate that resource-poor farmers in the Peruvian Amazon appear
to derive positive benefits from forest environmental services and that these benefit estimates are
significantly influenced by variables that reflect non-use values.  This justifies the use of CVM for
estimating the compensation required for land use change and implies that forest preservation can benefit
not only the world community, but also resource-poor farmers in developing countries.
Confidence intervals for the mean and median valuation estimates are constructed from the four
regression models, to take account of  differences between true and reported valuations (Smith et al.,
1997). Upper and lower bound estimates of the true values  (taking measurement error as well as model
error into account) are given in Table 1.
GAINS FROM TRADE IN CARBON SEQUESTRATION SERVICES
Following Boscolo et al. (1997), carbon sequestration is measured as net carbon accumulation (NCA)  i.e.
the difference in carbon stock over time for each type of land use (slash-and-burn, forest preservation and
agroforstry). Carbon sequestered through land use change (NCAij)  is taken as the  difference in NCA
between  slash-and-burn  and forest preservation or agroforestry.
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where NCAi,j. t+1= difference in net carbon accumulation between land use j and land use i in time period
t+1, where, j = 1 = forest preservation, j = 2 = agroforestry, i = slash-and-burn.
Natural forest in the Pucallpa region stores some 180 tC/ha. in aboveground biomass (Ricse et al., 1996).
Root biomass is estimated as 20% of above ground biomass (Schroeder and Winjum, 1995). The same
proportion is used for the other land uses. Soil carbon under forest and all other uses is estimated at 50
tC/ha.  In accordance with usual practice in the area, slash-and burn agriculture is assumed to consist of
two years of cropping, followed by three years of fallow. Cropped fields are estimated to have 10 tC/ha
and 2 tC/ha (above and below ground respectively).  Fallows are estimated to accumulate biomass at the
annual rate of 10 tC/ha. (Szott et al., 1994; Woomer et al., 1996) and 20% of that below ground. Biomass
production  for multistrata agroforestry systems is estimated to be at  an annual rate of 10 tC/ha.
(Schroeder, 1994). Net carbon accumulation by products of slash-and-burn and agroforestry are not taken
into account in these calculations.
The global benefit from carbon sequestration resulting from land use change is calculated as the Present
Value (PV) of the differences in NCA due to land use change weighted by the discounted shadow price of
carbon. The time horizon is taken as 15 years, to represent the likely duration of a carbon sequestration
project.
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where PVGij = Present value of global benefit from land use change  ($/ha) and  Pt = discounted shadow
of carbon in time period t
For the  discounted shadow price of carbon, global damage cost estimates from Fankhauser (1995) are
used for the calculations in row 1 of Table 5. Fankhauser (1995) derives the present value of the cost of
damage by using a stochastic model of the relationship between emissions and atmospheric concentration,
which in turn affects temperature and therefore damage costs. Discounted global damage estimates
increase over time from $20.3/tC in 1991-2000 to $27.8/tC in 2021-2030. Increases are due to increases in
world population and wealth (and therefore the cost of damage) over time, as well as the increasing
impact of emissions on atmospheric concentration, as emissions build up over time.
Given the controversy surrounding  estimates of global damage,  we vary the most controversial element
of the discount rate: the utility discount rate or the rate at which society discounts future consumption
relative to current consumption. Row 1 in Table 5 uses Fankhauser’s estimates in which the utility
discount rate is randomly varied between zero, 0.5% and 3%. In row 2, Fankhauser’s estimates of the
shadow price of carbon at a fixed utility discount rate of 3% is used. This higher discount rate lowers the
shadow price to $5.5/tC in 1919-2000 and $8.3 in 2021-2030.
Results show that the PV of the global benefit from forest preservation is 12% higher than the benefit
from agroforestry, under the higher shadow price of carbon. The higher value for forest preservation is
due to the prevention of  emissions resulting from deforestation, which are achieved in the first year and
therefore have a higher value relative to later emission reductions.  The difference between the global
benefits of forest preservation and agroforestry falls to about 7% under a lower shadow price for carbon.
The local cost of land use change is calculated  as  the PV of farmers’ median bids for changing their land
use system (WTA for economic losses minus WTP for environmental services: Table 1). Transactions
costs of organizing farmers and monitoring for compliance are excluded from these calculations. Discount
rates of 30% and 20% are used, representing the discount rates of small-scale farmers in developing
countries (Cuesta et al., 1994). Results based on median bids by farmers as well as the upper and lower
bounds are given in rows 3 and 4.
Results show that the PV of farmers’ bids is 76% higher for forest preservation than for agroforestry, a
difference which is considerably larger than the difference in the PV of carbon sequestration services of6
these two land use changes. As a result, the ratios of global benefit to local  cost (given in rows 5-8) are
more favorable for agroforestry than for forest preservation. Benefit/Cost ratios (B/C) are highly sensitive
to the shadow price of carbon. At the higher shadow price of carbon, global benefits are  5 to 12 times
more than local costs, implying that the benefits are high enough to justify the payments requested by
farmers, even if B/C ratios are reduced fourfold to account for transactions costs and the uncertainty
surrounding carbon sequestration estimates. At the lower prices of carbon, however, B/C ratios fall to
around  2, implying that  payments requested by farmers may be too high in relation to the global benefits
of carbon sequestration alone, particularly in the case of forest preservation. It should be noted that these
estimates exclude other environmental benefits of forest preservation (such as habitat preservation), which
if taken into account, may increase benefit/cost ratios to acceptable levels. Farmers’ bids are also  likely to
fall if the extraction of forest products is not totally prohibited in preserved areas. This indicates the
importance of investigating the compatibility of  forest product extraction with carbon sequestration and
other environmental services.
We next compare the cost of carbon sequestration through land use change to the cost  of emission
reduction by utility companies. Cost/tC through land use change is calculated by dividing the annual
payment required by farmers  by the annuity value of changes in NCA brought about by land use change.
Following Ridley (1997), NCA in each time period  is weighted by the shadow price of carbon in that time
period normalized by the price in the first time period. NCAij  is discounted  at a social discount rate of
4.4% (Ridley, 1997). Results given in rows 7 and 8 in Table 5 show that the cost/tC ranges from $8 to $10
for forest preservation and agroforestry, under both high and low carbon prices. These figures are
comparable to cost estimates from other forestry based carbon sequestration projects in developing
countries. In an analysis of eight developing country carbon sequestration forestry projects, the cost/tC
was $12, ranging from $3 to $35 (Ridley, 1997). Swisher and Masters (1992) report similar figures,
ranging from $3 to $25.
Swisher and Masters (1992) analysis of emission reduction costs for a US utility company shows that by
partially substituting  natural gas for coal, emissions could be reduced by 35% at a marginal cost of
$100/tC and by 40% at a marginal cost of $200/tC. Of this, the first 8% could be achieved at negative cost
by investing in energy end-use efficiency improvements. These costs of reducing carbon emissions
through fuel switching are comparable to those obtained in Ridley’s analysis of fuel switching projects in
nine countries giving an average cost/tC of $165, ranging from $50/tC to $429/tC. These figures indicate
that, if emission reduction targets are set at sufficiently high levels,  substantial gains to trade appear to
exist, even if our estimates are increased fourfold to account for transactions costs and the uncertainties
connected with sequestration estimates.
CONCLUSIONS
Our study strikes an optimistic note within the generally pessimistic scenarios on tropical deforestation.
The possibility of mutually profitable trade in carbon sequestration services appears to exist between
carbon emitting companies and small-scale farmers, provided emission reduction targets are set high
enough. This market-based approach could fundamentally alter the economics of forested land versus
other land uses and thus considerably enhance the effectiveness of traditional efforts to save tropical
forests. Farmers incur substantial opportunity costs in switching from slash-and-burn to forest
preservation and agroforestry. Thus, it is crucial to investigate whether the potential  benefits from these
land use systems can be increased without compromising their environmental services. In addition to
carbon sequestration, other environmental services of forests also need to be considered when designing
improved forestry-based systems, in order to ensure that global benefits from land use change are large
enough to justify the compensation required by farmers. Contrary to conventional wisdom, slash-and burn
farmers are willing to forego substantial amounts of potential income in order to obtain the local
environmental benefits of forests. Thus global trade in carbon services could benefit not only the world
community, but also resource-poor farmers.7
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